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Abstract
This paper considers a two-hop network architecture known as a combination network, where a
layer of relay nodes connects a server to a set of end users. In particular, a new model is investigated
where the intermediate relays employ caches in addition to the end users. First, a new centralized
coded caching scheme is developed that utilizes maximum distance separable (MDS) coding, jointly
optimizes cache placement and delivery phase, and enables decomposing the combination network into
a set virtual multicast sub-networks. It is shown that if the sum of the memory of an end user and its
connected relay nodes is sufficient to store the database, then the server can disengage in the delivery
phase and all the end users’ requests can be satisfied by the caches in the network. Lower bounds on
the normalized delivery load using genie-aided cut-set arguments are presented along with second hop
optimality. Next recognizing the information security concerns of coded caching, this new model is
studied under three different secrecy settings: 1) secure delivery where we require an external entity
must not gain any information about the database files by observing the transmitted signals over the
network links, 2) secure caching, where we impose the constraint that end users must not be able to
obtain any information about files that they did not request, and 3) both secure delivery and secure
caching, simultaneously. We demonstrate how network topology affects the system performance under
these secrecy requirements. Finally, we provide numerical results demonstrating the system performance
in each of the settings considered.
Index Terms
Combination networks with caching relays, coded caching, maximum distance separable (MDS)
codes, secure delivery, secure caching.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Caching is foreseen as a promising avenue to provide content based delivery services for 5G
systems and beyond [1], [2]. Caching enables shifting the network load from peak to off-peak
hours leading to a significant improvement in overall network performance. During off-peak
hours, in the cache placement phase, the network is likely to have a considerable amount of
under-utilized wireless bandwidth which is exploited to place functions of data contents in the
cache memories of the network nodes. This phase takes place prior to the end users’ content
requests, and thus content needs to be placed in the caches without knowing what specific content
each user will request. The cached contents help reduce the required transmission load when the
end users actually request the contents, during peak traffic time, known as the delivery phase,
not only by alleviating the need to download the entire requested data, but also by facilitating
multicast transmissions that benefit multiple end users [3]. As long as the storage capabilities
increase, the required transmission load during peak traffic can be decreased, leading to the
rate-memory trade-off [3], [4].
Various network topologies with caching capabilities have been investigated to date, see
for example [5]–[13]. References [5], [8]–[11] have studied two-hop cache-aided networks.
Reference [5] has studied hierarchical networks, where the server is connected to a set of relay
nodes via a shared multicast link and the end users are divided into equal-size groups such that
each group is connected to only one relay node via a multicast link. Thus, one relay needs to
be shared by multiple users. We will not consider this model.
A fundamentally different model is investigated in references [8] and [9] where multiple
overlapping relays serve each user. In this symmetric layered network, known as a combination
network [14], the server is connected to a set of h relay nodes, and each end user is connected
to exactly r relay nodes, thus each relay serves
(
h−1
r−1
)
end nodes. In these references, end users
randomly cache a fraction of bits from each file subject to the memory capacity constraint.
Two delivery strategies have been proposed: one relies on routing the requested bits via the
network links and the other is based on coded multicasting and combination network coding
techniques [15]. More recently, reference [10] has considered a class of networks which satisfies
the resolvability property, which includes combination networks where r divides h [16]. A
3centralized coded caching scheme has been proposed and shown to outperform, analytically and
numerically, those in [8] and [9]. The cache allocation of [10] explicitly utilizes resolvability
property, so that one can design the cache contents that make each relay node see the same
set of cache allocations. In all of these references studying combination networks -resolvable or
not-, only the end users are equipped with cache memories.
In this paper, we boost the caching capabilities of combination networks by introducing caches
at the relay nodes. In particular, we consider a general combination network equipped with caches
at both the relay nodes and the end users. The model in effect enables cooperation between
caches from different layers to aid the server. We develop a new centralized coded caching
scheme, by utilizing maximum distance separable (MDS) codes [17] and jointly optimizing the
cache placement and delivery phases. This proposed construction enables decomposing the coded
caching in combination networks into sub-problems in the form of the classical setup studied in
[3]. We show that if the sum of the memory size of a user and its connected relay nodes is large
enough to store the library, then the server can disengage during the delivery phase altogether
and all users’ requests can be satisfied utilizing the cache memories of the relay nodes and end
users. Genie-aided cut-set lower bounds on the transmission rates are provided. Additionally, for
the special case, where there are no caches at the relays, we show that our scheme achieves the
same performance of the scheme in [10] without requiring resolvability.
In many practical scenarios, reliability is not the only consideration. Confidentiality, especially
in file sharing systems, is also of paramount importance. Thus in the latter part of the paper,
for the same model, we address the all important concerns of information security. Specifically,
we consider combination networks with caches at the relays and end users, under three different
scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider that the database files must be kept secret from any
external eavesdropper that overhears the delivery phase, i.e., secure delivery [18] [19]. In the
second scenario, we consider that each user must only be able to decode its requested file and
should not be able gain any information about the contents of the remaining files, i.e., secure
caching [20] [21]. Last, we consider both secure delivery and secure caching, simultaneously.
We note that, in security for cache-aided combination networks, the only previous work consists
of our recent effort [22], where the schemes are limited to resolvable combination networks with
4no caching relays.
For all the considered scenarios, our proposed schemes based on the decomposition turn
out to be optimal with respect to the total transmission load per relay, i.e., we achieve the
cut set bound. Our study demonstrates the impact of cache memories at the relay nodes (in
addition to the end users) in reducing the transmission load of the server. In effect, these caches
can cooperatively replace the server during the delivery phase under sufficient total memory.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the impact of the network topology on the system performance
under secrecy requirements. In particular, we demonstrate that satisfying the secure caching
requirement does not require encryption keys and is feasible even with memory size less than
the file size, unlike the case in references [20] and [21]. In addition, we observe that the cost
due the secure delivery is almost negligible in combination networks, similar to the cases in
references [18] and [19] for other network topologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. In
Section III, we propose a new centralized coded caching scheme that is applicable to any cache-
aided combination network. In Sections IV, V and VI, we detail the achievability techniques
for the three secrecy scenarios. In Section VII, we provide the numerical results and discuss the
insights learned from them. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
Consider a combination network, where the server, S, is connected to K end users via a
set of h relay nodes. More specifically, each end user is connected to a distinct set of r relay
nodes, r < h, with K =
(
h
r
)
. Each relay node is connected to Kˆ =
(
h−1
r−1
)
= rK
h
end users.
Similar to references [8]–[10], all network links are unicast. In addition, similar to references
[3]–[5], [8]–[10], [18]–[21], all network links are assumed to be noiseless. Let R={Γ1, ..,Γh}
denote the set of relay nodes, and U = {U1, .., UK} the set of all end users. We denote the set
of end users connected to Γi by N (Γi), |N (Γi)|= Kˆ for i = 1, .., h, and the set relay nodes
connected to user i by N (Ui), |N (Ui)| = r. The function Index(, ) : (i, k)→ {1, .., Kˆ}, where
i ∈ {1, .., h} and k ∈ N (Γi), is defined as a function that orders the end users connected to relay
5Fig. 1: A combination network with K=10, h=5, r=2, and caches at both relays and end users.
node Γi in an ascending manner. For example, for the network in Fig. 1, N (Γ2) = {1, 5, 6, 7},
N (Γ4) = {3, 6, 8, 10}, and
Index(2, 1) = 1, Index(2, 5) = 2, Index(2, 6) = 3, Index(2, 7) = 4,
Index(4, 3) = 1, Index(4, 6) = 2, Index(4, 8) = 3, Index(4, 10) = 4.
B. Caching Model
Server S has D files, W1, ..,WD, each with size F bits. We treat the case where the number
of users is less than or equal to the number of files, i.e., K ≤ D. Each end user is equipped
with a cache memory of size MF bits while each relay node has cache memory of size NF
bits, i.e., M and N denote the normalized cache memory sizes at the end users and relay nodes,
respectively. The system operates in two phases.
1) Cache Placement Phase: In this phase, the server allocates functions of its database files
in the relay nodes end users caches. The allocation is done ahead of and without the knowledge
of the demand of the individual users.
Definition 1. (Cache Placement): The content of the cache memories at relay node j and user
6k, respectively are given by
Vj = νj(W1,W2, ..,WD), Zk = φk(W1,W2, ..,WD), (1)
where νj : [2F ]D → [2F ]N and φk : [2F ]D → [2F ]M , i.e., H(Vj) ≤ NF and H(Zk) ≤MF. 
2) Delivery Phase: Each user requests a file independently and randomly [3]. Let dk denote
the index of the requested file by user k, i.e., dk ∈ {1, 2, .., D}; d represents the demand vector
of all users. The server responds to users’ requests by transmitting signals to the relay nodes.
Then, each relay transmits unicast signals to its connected end users. From the r received signals
and Zk, user k must be able to reconstruct its requested file Wdk .
Definition 2. (Coded Delivery): The mapping from the database files, {W1, ..,WD}, and the
demand vector d into the transmitted signal by the server to Γi is given by the encoding function
Xi,d = ψi(W1, ..,WD,d), i = 1, 2, .., h, (2)
where ψi : [2F ]D × {1, .., D}K → [2F ]R1 , and R1 is the rate, normalized by the file size, F , of
the transmitted signal from the server to each relay node. The transmitted signal from Γi to user
k ∈ N (Γi), is given by the encoding function
Yi,d,k = ϕk(Xi,d, Vi,d), (3)
where ϕk : [2F ]R1×[2F ]N×{1, .., D}K → [2F ]R2 , and R2 is the normalized rate of the transmitted
signal from a relay node to a connected end user. User k recovers its requested file by
Wˆk = µk(Zk,d, {Yi,d,k : i ∈ N (Uk)}), (4)
where µk : [2F ]M × {1, .., D}K × [2F ]rR2 → [2F ] is the decoding function. 
We require that each end user k recover its requested file reliably, i.e., for any  > 0,
max
d,k
P (Wˆdk 6= Wdk) < . (5)
7For a positive integer, L, we will use the notation [L] , {1, .., L}.
III. A NEW CODED CACHING SCHEME FOR COMBINATION NETWORKS
We develop a new caching scheme for general cache-aided combination networks. In addition,
we show that the upper bound derived in [10] for resolvable combination networks, is in fact
achievable for all combination networks.
The main idea behind our proposed scheme is that each file is encoded using an (h, r)
maximum distance separable (MDS) code [17], [23]. Then, each relay node acts as a server
for one of the resulting encoded symbols. Since each end user is connected to r different relay
nodes, by the end of the delivery phase, it will be able to obtain r different encoded symbols
that can be used to recover its requested file.
A. Cache Placement Phase
As a first step, the server divides each file into r equal-size subfiles. Then, it encodes them
using an (h, r) maximum distance separable (MDS) code [17], [23]. We denote by f in the resulting
encoded symbol, where n is the file index and i = 1, 2, .., h. The size of each encoded symbol,
f in, is F/r bits, and any r encoded symbols are sufficient to reconstruct the file n. The server
divides each encoded symbol into two parts, f i,1n and f
i,2
n , such that the size of f
i,1
n is
NF
D
bits,
and the size of f i,2n is (
1
r
− N
D
)F bits.
We describe the achievability for M = (t1−t2)Nr
Kˆ
+ t2D
Kˆ
, t1 ∈ {0, 1, ..,min(Kˆ, b KˆND c}, and
t2∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ}, noting that the convex envelope is achievable by memory sharing [3]. First, the
server places f j,1n , ∀n in the cache memory of relay node Γj . Then, user k, with k ∈ N (Γj),
caches a random fraction of t1
Kˆ
bits from f j,1n , ∀n, which we denote by f j,1n,k. On the other hand,
f i,2n is divided into
(
Kˆ
t2
)
disjoint pieces each of which is denoted by f i,2n,T , where n is the file
index, i.e., n ∈ [D], i is the index of the encoded symbol, i = 1, .., h, and T ⊆ [Kˆ], |T |= t2. The
size of each piece is (
1
r
−N
D
)
(Kˆt2)
F bits. The server allocates the pieces f j,2n,T , ∀n in the cache memory
of user k if k ∈ N (Γj) and Index(j, k) ∈ T . Therefore, the cache contents at the relay nodes
and end users are given by
Vk=
{
fk,1n : ∀n
}
, Zk=
{
f j,1n,k, f
j,2
n,T :j∈N (Uk), Index(j, k)∈T ,∀n
}
. (6)
8Algorithm 1 Cache placement procedure
Input: {W1, . . . ,WD}
Output: Zk, k ∈ [K]
1: for l ∈ [D] do
2: Encode each file using an (h, r) MDS code → f il , i = 1, .., h.
3: for i ∈ [h] do
4: Divide f il into f
i,1
l with size
NF
D
bits and f i,2l with size (
1
r
− N
D
)F bits.
5: Vi ← f i,1l
6: Partition f i,2l into equal-size pieces f
i,2
l,T , T ⊆ [Kˆ] and |T |= t2.
7: end for
8: end for
9: for k ∈ [K] do
10: User k caches a random fraction t1
Kˆ
bits from f j,1n , ∀n → f j,1n,k
11: Zk ←
⋃
j∈N (Uk)
⋃
l∈[N ]
{
f jl,T : Index(j, k) ∈ T
}⋃
f j,1l,k
12: end for
Clearly, this satisfies the memory constraint at each relay node. The number of the accumulated
bits at the cache memory of each end user is given by
Dr
N
D
t1
Kˆ
F +Dr
(1
r
− N
D
)(
Kˆ
t2
) F(Kˆ− 1
t2− 1
)
=
Nt1r
Kˆ
F +
(D −Nr)t2
Kˆ
F = MF, (7)
which satisfies the memory constraint. We summarize the cache placement procedure in Algo-
rithm 1.
B. Coded Delivery Phase
After announcing the demand vector to the network, the server and the relays start to serve
the end users’ requests. For each relay Γj , at each transmission instance, we consider S ⊆ [Kˆ],
where |S| = t2 + 1. For each choice of S, the server transmits to the relay node Γj , the signal
XSj,d =
⊕
{i:i∈N (Γj), Index(j,i)∈S}
f j,2di,S\{Index(j,i)}. (8)
In total, the server transmits to Γj the signal
Xj,d =
⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t2+1
{
XSj,d
}
. (9)
9Algorithm 2 Delivery procedure
Input: d
Output: Xj,d, Yj,d,i, j ∈ [h], i ∈ [K]
1: for j ∈ [h] do
2: for S ∈ [Kˆ], |S| = t2 + 1 do
3: XSj,d ←
⊕
{i:i∈N (Γj), Index(j,i)∈S} f
j,2
di,S\{Index(j,i)}
4: end for
5: Xj,d ←
⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]{XSj,d}
6: for i ∈ N (Γj) do
7: Yj,d,i ←
{
f j,1di \ f j,1di,i
}⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:Index(j,i)∈S{XSj,d}
8: end for
9: end for
Γj forwards the signal XSj,d to user i whenever Index(j, i) ∈ S. In addition, Γj transmits the
missing bits from f j,1di to user i, i ∈ N (Γj). The transmitted signal from Γj to user i is
Yj,d,i =
{
f j,1di \ f j,1di,i
} ⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t2+1,Index(j,i)∈S
{
XSj,d
}
. (10)
User i can recover
{
f j,2di,T : T ⊆ [Kˆ] \ {Index(j, i)}
}
from the signals received from Γj , utilizing
its cache’s contents. XORing these pieces to the ones already in its cache, i.e., f j,2di,T with
Index(j, i) ∈ T , user i can recover the encoded symbol f j,2di . Additionally, from its received
signal, user i directly gets f j,1di . Therefore, it can obtain f
j
di
. Since, user i receives signals
from r different relay nodes, it can obtain the encoded symbols f jdi , ∀j ∈ N (Ui), and is
able to successfully reconstruct its requested file Wdi . The delivery procedure is summarized
in Algorithm 2.
C. Rates
First, observe that the server transmits
(
Kˆ
t2+1
)
sub-signals to each relay node, each of which
has length (
1
r
−N
D
)
(Kˆt2)
F bits, thus the transmission rate in bits from the server to each relay node is
R1F =
(
Kˆ
t2+1
)
(1
r
−N
D
)(
Kˆ
t2
) F = (Kˆ−t2)(1r−ND )
t2 + 1
F. (11)
During the second hop, each relay node forwards
(
Kˆ−1
t2
)
from its received sub-signals to each
of its connected end users. Additionally, it sends (1 − t1
Kˆ
)N
D
F bits, from its cache memory to
10
each of its connected end users. Therefore, we have
R2F =
(
Kˆ − 1
t2
)
(1
r
−N
D
)(
Kˆ
t2
) F + (1− t1
Kˆ
)
N
D
F =
(Kˆ − t2)(1r−ND )
Kˆ
F +
(Kˆ − t1)N
DKˆ
F
=
1
r
(
1− t2
Kˆ
− (t1 − t2)Nr
DKˆ
)
F =
1
r
(
1−M
D
)
F. (12)
These findings are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The normalized transmission rates, for 0 ≤ N ≤ D
r
, M = (t1−t2)Nr
Kˆ
+ t2D
Kˆ
, t1 ∈
{0, 1, ..,min(Kˆ, b KˆN
D
c}, and t2∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ}, are upper bounded by
R1 ≤ Kˆ − t2
r(t2 + 1)
(
1− Nr
D
)
, R2 ≤ 1
r
(
1− M
D
)
. (13)
Furthermore, the convex envelope of these points is achievable. 
If M is not in the form of M = (t1−t2)Nr
Kˆ
+ t2D
Kˆ
, we use memory sharing as in [3], [5].
Remark 1. Observe that the caches at the relays help decrease the transmission load only during
the first hop, R1. The transmission load over the second hop, R2, depends only on the size of
end users’ cache memories, M , as it is always equal to the complement of the local caching
gain divided by the number of relay nodes connected to each end users. 
Remark 2. It can be seen from (13) that when t2 = Kˆ, i.e., M ≥ D − Nr, we can achieve
R1 = 0. In other words, whenever M + Nr ≥ D, i.e., the total memory at each end user and
its connected relay nodes is sufficient to store the whole file library, the server is not required
to transmit during the delivery phase. 
When there are no caches at the relays [8], [9], i.e., setting N = 0 and t1 = 0, we obtain the
following result.
Corollary 1. The normalized transmission rates, for N = 0, M = tD
Kˆ
, and t∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ}, are
upper bounded by
R1 ≤ Kˆ
r
(
1− M
D
)
1
1 + KˆM
D
, R2 ≤ 1
r
(
1− M
D
)
. (14)
In addition, the convex envelope of these points is achievable. 
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Remark 3. The achievable rates in (14) are the same as the ones in [10] which have been
shown to be achievable for a special class of combination networks where r divides h, i.e.,
resolvable networks. By our scheme, we have just demonstrated that the resolvability property is
not necessary to achieve these rates. Furthermore, it has been shown in [10] that, for resolvable
networks, these rates outperform the ones in [8] and [9]. Thus, our proposed scheme outperforms
the ones in [8] and [9]. 
Remark 4. One can see from (14) that the upper bound on R1 is formed by the product of
three terms. The first term Kˆ
r
is due the fact that each relay node is connected to Kˆ end users,
each of which is connected to r relay nodes. Thus, each relay node is responsible for 1
r
of the
load on a server that is connected to Kˆ end users. The second term (1 − M
D
) represents the
local caching gain at each end user. The term 1
1+ KˆM
D
represents the global caching gain of the
proposed scheme. 
The merit our proposed scheme is that it allows us to virtually decompose the combination
network into a set of sub-networks, each of which in the form of the multicast network [3]. In
particular, for the case where N =0, each relay node acts as a virtual server with library of D
files each of size F/r bits, while each connected end user dedicates 1/r from its memory to this
library. Therefore, any scheme developed for the classical multicast setup [3] which achieves rate
RMulticast(MF/r,D, Kˆ, F/r) can be utilized in the context of combination networks and achieves
rate R1 = RMulticast. In other words, for large enough F , schemes developed for the cases where
the users’ demands are non-uniform [24], the number of user is greater than the number of files,
[25], for small values of the end users memories [26], utilizing coded prefetching [27], can be
adopted in a combination network after the decomposition step via MDS coding.
In addition, by applying the proposed decomposition, we can utilize any scheme that is
developed for combination networks with no relay caches, N = 0, in the case where the relays
are equipped with cache memories, i.e., 0 < N ≤ D
r
, as indicated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the rate pair RN=01 (MF,D,K, F ) and RN=02 (MF,D,K, F ) is
known to be achievable in a combination network with no relay caches. Then, for a combination
12
network with relay cache of size NF bits, the rate pair R1 = RN=01 (M1F,D,K, (1− NrD )F ) and
R2 = R
N=0
2 (M1F,D,K, (1− NrD )F )+(Nr−M2) FrD is achievable for any choice of M1,M2 ≥ 0
and M1 +M2 ≤M . 
Proof. Split each file of the database, Wi into two subfiles W 1i of size
Nr
D
F bits and W 2i of size
(1 − Nr
D
)F bits. Encode each of subfiles {W 1i , ∀i} using an (h, r) MDS code. Each encoded
symbol is cached by one of the relays. Divide the cache of each end user into two partitions
of sizes M1F and M2F such that M1 + M2 ≤ M . The partition of M1F bits is dedicated to
the library formed by the subfiles {W 2i , ∀i}, for which we apply any caching scheme that is
known for a combination networks with no relay caches. The second partition of size M2F is
filled by bits from the memories of relays connected to the end user as explained in subsection
III-A, leading to the achievable pair in the proposition.
D. An Illustrative Example
We illustrate our proposed scheme by an example. Consider the network depicted in Fig. 1,
where D=10, N = 0 and M= 15
2
, i.e., t = 3. This network is not resolvable.
1) Cache Placement Phase: Each file, Wn, is divided into 2 subfiles. Then, the server encodes
them using an (5, 2) MDS code. We denote the resulting encoded symbols by f jn, where n is
the file index, i.e., n = 1, .., 10, and j = 1, .., 5. Furthermore, we divide each encoded symbol
into 4 pieces each of size F
8
bits, and denoted by f jn,T , where T ⊆ [4] and |T |=3. The contents
of the cache memories at the end users are given in Table I. Observe that each user stores 6
pieces of the encoded symbols of each file, i.e., 3
4
F bits, which satisfies the memory constraint.
2) Coded Delivery Phase: Assume that user k requests the file Wk, and k = 1, .., 10. The
server transmits the following signals
X1,d = f
1
4,123 ⊕ f 13,124 ⊕ f 12,134 ⊕ f 11,234, X2,d = f 27,123 ⊕ f 26,124 ⊕ f 25,134 ⊕ f 21,234,
X3,d = f
3
9,123 ⊕ f 38,124 ⊕ f 35,134 ⊕ f 32,234, X4,d = f 410,123 ⊕ f 48,124 ⊕ f 46,134 ⊕ f 44,234,
and X5,d = f 510,123 ⊕ f 59,124 ⊕ f 57,134 ⊕ f 54,234.
13
User i Zi
1
{
f1n,123, f
1
n,124, f
1
n,134, f
2
n,123, f
2
n,124, f
2
n,134 : ∀n
}
2
{
f1n,123, f
1
n,124, f
1
n,234, f
3
n,123, f
3
n,124, f
3
n,134 : ∀n
}
3
{
f1n,123, f
1
n,134, f
1
n,234, f
4
n,123, f
4
n,124, f
4
n,134 : ∀n
}
4
{
f1n,124, f
1
n,134, f
1
n,234, f
5
n,123, f
5
n,124, f
5
n,134 : ∀n
}
5
{
f2n,123, f
2
n,124, f
2
n,234, f
3
n,123, f
3
n,124, f
3
n,234 : ∀n
}
6
{
f2n,123, f
2
n,134, f
2
n,234, f
4
n,123, f
4
n,124, f
4
n,234 : ∀n
}
7
{
f2n,124, f
2
n,134, f
2
n,234, f
5
n,123, f
5
n,124, f
5
n,234 : ∀n
}
8
{
f3n,123, f
3
n,134, f
3
n,234, f
4
n,123, f
4
n,134, f
4
n,234 : ∀n
}
9
{
f3n,124, f
3
n,134, f
3
n,234, f
5
n,123, f
5
n,134, f
5
n,234 : ∀n
}
10
{
f4n,124, f
4
n,134, f
4
n,234, f
5
n,124, f
5
n,134, f
5
n,234 : ∀n
}
Table I: The cache contents at the end users for N = K = 10 and M = 15
2
.
Then, each relay node forwards its received signal to the set of connected users, i.e., Yi,d,k =
Xi,d, ∀k ∈ N (Γi). The size of each transmitted signal is equal to the size of a piece of the
encoded symbols, i.e., 1
8
F . Thus, R1 = R2 = 18 . Now, utilizing its memory, user 1 can extract
the pieces f 11,234 and f
2
1,234 from the signals received from relay nodes Γ1 and Γ2, respectively.
Therefore, user 1 reconstructs f 11 and f
2
1 , and decodes its requested file W1. Similarly, user 2
reconstructs f 12 and f
3
2 , then decodes W2, and so on for the remaining users.
E. Lower Bounds
Next, we derive genie-aided lower bounds on the delivery load.
1) Lower bound on R1: Consider a cut that contains l relay nodes, l ∈ {r, .., h}, and s end
users from the
(
l
r
)
end users who are connected exclusively to these l relay nodes. The remaining
end users are served by a genie. Suppose at the first request instance, these s users request the
files W1 to Ws. Then, at the second request instance, they request the files Ws+1 to W2s, and so
on till the request instance bD/sc. In order to satisfy all users’ requests, the total transmission
load from the server and the total memory inside the cut must satisfy
H(W1, ..,WsbD/sc) = sbD/scF ≤ bD/sclR1F + sMF + lNF. (15)
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Therefore, we can get
R1 ≥ 1
l
(
s− sM + lNbD/sc
)
. (16)
Similar to [8, Appendix B-A], the smallest number of relay nodes serving a set of x users equals
to u = min(x+ r − 1, h). Therefore, by the cut set argument, we can get
R1 ≥ 1
u
(
x−xM + uNbD/xc
)
. (17)
2) Lower bound on R2: Consider the cut that contains user k only. Assume N request
instances such that at instance i, user k requests the file Wi. Then, we have the following
constraint in order to satisfy the user’s requests
H(W1, ..,WD) = DF ≤ DrR2 +MF. (18)
Therefore, we can get the following bound on R2
R2 ≥ 1
r
(
1− M
D
)
. (19)
Now, taking into account all possible cuts, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The normalized transmission rates for 0 < M + rN ≤ D are lower bounded by
R1 ≥ max
(
max
l∈{r,..,h}
max
s∈{1,..,min(D,(lr))}
1
l
(
s− sM + lNbD/sc
)
, max
x∈{1,..,min(D,K)}
1
u
(
x−xM + uNbD/xc
))
,
(20)
where u = min(x+ r − 1, h), and
R2 ≥ 1
r
(
1− M
D
)
. (21)

In the following three sections, we investigate the cache-aided combination network under
three different secrecy requirements.
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IV. CODED CACHING WITH SECURE DELIVERY
First, we examine the system with secure delivery. That is, we require that any external
eavesdropper that observes the transmitted signals during the delivery phase, must not gain any
information about the files, i.e., for any δ > 0
I(X ,Y ;W1, ..WD) < δ, (22)
where X ,Y are the sets of transmitted signals by the server and the relay nodes, respectively.
In order to satisfy (22), we place keys in the network caches during the placement phase. These
keys are used to encrypt, i.e., one-time pad [28], the transmitted signals during the delivery phase
as in [18] and [19].
A. Cache Placement Phase
We start by providing a scheme for M = 1+ t2(D−1)
Kˆ
+ (t1−t2)r(D−1)N
Kˆ(N+Kˆ−t1) , where t1, t2∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ}
and t1
Kˆ
≤ N
D+Kˆ−t1 . Other values of M are achievable by memory sharing. First, the server encodes
each file using an MDS code to obtain the encoded symbols {f in : i ∈ [h]}. Then, the servers
divides each encoded symbol into two parts, f i,1n with size
NF
D+Kˆ−t1 bits and f
i,2
n with size
F
r
− NF
D+Kˆ−t1 bits. Second, the server places f
j,1
n , ∀n in the cache memory of relay node Γj .
Then, user k, with k ∈ N (Γj), caches a random fraction of t1Kˆ bits from f j,1n , ∀n, which we
denote by f j,1n,k. On the other hand, f
i,2
n is divided into
(
Kˆ
t2
)
disjoint pieces each of which is
denoted by f i,2n,T , where n is the file index, i.e., n ∈ [D], i is the index of the encoded symbol,
i = 1, .., h, and T ⊆ [Kˆ], |T |= t2. The size of each piece is
F
r
− NF
D+Kˆ−t1
(Kˆt2)
F bits. The server allocates
the pieces f j,2n,T , ∀n in the cache memory of user k if k ∈ N (Γj) and Index(j, k) ∈ T .
In addition, the server generates h
(
Kˆ
t2+1
)
independent keys. Each key is uniformly distributed
with length
F
r
− NF
D+Kˆ−t1
(Kˆt2)
F bits. We denote each key by KuTK , where u = 1, .., h, and TK ⊆
[Kˆ], |TK | = t2 + 1. User i stores the keys KuTK , ∀u ∈ N (Ui), whenever Index(u, i) ∈ TK .
Also, the sever generates the random keys Kij each of length
NF (Kˆ−t1)
(D+Kˆ−t1)Kˆ bits, for i = 1, .., h and
j = 1, .., Kˆ. Kij will be cached by relay i and user k with Index(i, k) = j. Therefore, the cache
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contents at the relay nodes and end users are given by
Vk=
{
fk,1n , K
k
j : ∀n, j
}
, (23)
Zk =
{
f j,1n,k, K
j
l , f
j,2
n,T , K
j
TK : ∀n,∀j∈N (Uk), Index(j, k)∈T , TK , Index(j, k)= l
}
. (24)
The accumulated number of bits cached by each relay is given by
D
NF
D + Kˆ − t1
+ Kˆ
NF (Kˆ − t1)
(D + Kˆ − t1)Kˆ
=
DNF +NFKˆ −NFt1
D + Kˆ − t1
= NF. (25)
The accumulated of bits at each end user is given by
Dr
(
Kˆ−1
t2−1
)(
Kˆ
t2
) |f i,2n |+ r
(
Kˆ−1
t2
)
F(
Kˆ
t2
) |f i,2n |+ Drt1
Kˆ
|f i,1n |+
r(Kˆ − t1)
Kˆ
|f i,1n |
=
Drt2
Kˆ
|f i,2n |+
r(Kˆ − t2)
Kˆ
|f i,2n |+
Drt1
Kˆ
|f i,1n |+
r(Kˆ − t1)
Kˆ
|f i,1n |
= F +
t2(D − 1)F
Kˆ
+
(t1 − t2)r(D − 1)NF
Kˆ(N + Kˆ − t1)
= MF, (26)
thus satisfying the memory constraints on all caches.
B. Coded Delivery Phase
At the beginning of the delivery phase, the demand vector d is announced in the network. For
each relay node Γj , at each transmission instance, we consider S ⊆ [Kˆ], where |S| = t2 + 1.
For each S, the server sends to the relay node Γj , the signal
XSj,d = K
j
S
⊕
{i:i∈N (Γj), Index(j,i)∈S}
f jdi,S\{Index(j,i)}. (27)
In total, the server transmits to Γj , the signal Xj,d =
⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t2+1{XSj,d}. Then, Γj forwards
the signal XSj,d to user i whenever Index(j, i) ∈ S. In addition, the relay Γj sends f j,1di \ f j,1di,i to
user i encrypted by the key Kjk such that Index(j, i) = k, i.e., we have
Yj,d,i =
{
Kjk ⊕ {f j,1di \ f j,1di,i}
} ⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t2+1,Index(j,i)∈S
{
XSj,d
}
. (28)
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First, user i can decrypt its received signals using the cached keys. Then, it can recover the
pieces
{
f j,2di,T : T ⊆ [Kˆ] \ {Index(j, i)}
}
from the signals received from Γj , utilizing its cache’s
contents. With its cached contents, user i can recover f j,2di . In addition, user i directly gets f
j,1
di
from its the signal transmitted by relay j. Thus, it can obtain f jdi . Since, user i receives signals
from r different relay nodes, it can obtain the encoded symbols f jdi , ∀j ∈ N (Ui), and is able to
successfully reconstruct its requested file Wdi .
Remark 5. In total, the server sends h
(
Kˆ
t2+1
)
signals, each of which is encrypted using a one-time
pad that has length equal to the length of each subfile ensuring prefect secrecy [28]. Observing
any of the transmitted signals without knowing the encryption key will not reveal any information
about the database files [28]. The same applies for the messages transmitted by the relays. Thus,
(22) is satisfied. 
C. Secure Delivery Rates
Denote the secure delivery rates in the first and second hop with Rs1 and R
s
2, respectively. Each
relay node is responsible for
(
Kˆ
t2+1
)
transmissions, each of length |f
i,2
n |
(Kˆt2)
, thus the transmission rate
in bits from the server to each relay node is
Rs1F =
(
Kˆ
t2+1
)(
Kˆ
t2
) |f i,2n |= Kˆ − t2(t2 + 1)
(
F
r
− NF
D + Kˆ − t1
)
. (29)
Γj forwards
(
Kˆ−1
t2
)
from its received signals to each connected end users. In addition, it transmits
a message of size NF (Kˆ−t1)
(D+Kˆ−t1)Kˆ bits from its cached contents to each user, thus we have
Rs2F =
(
Kˆ−1
t2
)(
Kˆ
t2
) |f i,2n |+ NF (Kˆ − t1)
(D + Kˆ − t1)Kˆ
=
(
1− t2
Kˆ
)(
F
r
− NF
D + Kˆ − t1
)
+
NF (Kˆ − t1)
(D + Kˆ − t1)Kˆ
=
F
r
(
1− M − 1
N − 1
)
. (30)
We thus obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The normalized transmission rates with secure delivery, for N ≥ 0, M = 1 +
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t2(D−1)
Kˆ
+ (t1−t2)r(D−1)N
Kˆ(N+Kˆ−t1) , t1, t2∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ} and
t1
Kˆ
≤ N
D+Kˆ−t1 , are upper bounded by
Rs1 ≤
Kˆ − t2
r(t2 + 1)
(
1− Nr
D + Kˆ − t1
)
, Rs2 ≤
1
r
(
1− M − 1
D − 1
)
. (31)
In addition, the convex envelope of these points is achievable by memory sharing. 
For the special case of no caches at the relays, i.e., N = 0, t1 = 0, we obtain the following
upper bound on the secure delivery rates.
Corollary 2. The normalized transmission rates with secure delivery, for N = 0, M=1+ t(D−1)
Kˆ
,
and t∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ}, are upper bounded by
Rs1 ≤
Kˆ
(
1− M−1
D−1
)
r
(
KˆM−1
D−1 + 1
) , Rs2 ≤ 1r
(
1− M − 1
D − 1
)
. (32)
In addition, the convex envelope of these points is achievable by memory sharing. 
Remark 6. Under secure delivery, we place keys in the memories of both end user and relays,
i.e., we divide the cache between storing data and keys. Observe that the rate of the second hop
is the complement of the data caching gain of end user and is determined by M only. In addition,
whenever M ≥ D, each user can cache the entire library and there is no need for caching keys
as Rs1 = R
s
2 = 0. On the other hand, the rate of the first hop R
s
1 is affected by both M and N .
We achieve zero rate over the first hop whenever t2 = Kˆ, i.e., we need M ≥ D − (D−1)NrKˆ+N . 
V. COMBINATION NETWORKS WITH SECURE CACHING
Next, we consider secure caching, i.e., an end user must be able to recover its requested file,
and must not be able to obtain any information about the remaining files, i.e., for δ>0
max
d,V
I(W−dk ; {Yj,d,k : j ∈ N (Uk)}, Zk) < δ, (33)
where W−dk ={W1, ..,WN}\{Wdk}, i.e., the set of all files except the one requested by user k.
In our achievability, we utilize secret sharing schemes [29] to ensure that no user is able
to obtain information about the files from its cached contents. The basic idea of the secret
sharing schemes is to encode the secret in such a way that accessing a subset of shares does
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not suffice to reduce the uncertainty about the secret. For instance, if the secret is encoded into
the scaling coefficient of a line equation, the knowledge of one point on the line does not reveal
any information about the secret as there remain infinite number of possibilities to describe the
line. One can learn the secret only if two points on the line are provided.
In particular, we use a class of secret sharing scheme known as non-perfect secret sharing
schemes, defined as follows.
Definition 3. [29] [30] For a secret W with size F bits, an (m,n) non-perfect secret sharing
scheme generates n shares, S1, S2, ..Sn, such that accessing any m shares does not reveal any
information about the file W , i.e.,
I(W ;S) = 0, ∀S ⊆ {S1, S2, ..Sn}, |S| ≤ m. (34)
Furthermore, W can be losslessly reconstructed from the n shares, i.e.,
H(W |S1, S2, .., Sn)=0. (35)

For large enough F , an (m,n) secret sharing scheme exists with shares of size equal to F
n−m
bits [29], [30].
A. Cache Placement Phase
Again, as a first step, the server divides each file into r equal-size subfiles. Then, it encodes
them using an (h, r) maximum distance separable (MDS) code. We denote by f in the resulting
encoded symbol, where n is the file index and i = 1, 2, .., h. For M = tD
Kˆ−t(1 − NrD ) and
t∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ−1}, we divide each encoded symbol into two parts, f i,1n with size NFD bits and
f i,2n with size
F
r
− NF
D
bits. The parts {f i,1n : ∀n} will be cached in the memory of relay Γi and
will not be cached by any user.
Each of the symbols f i,2n is encoded using a
((
Kˆ−1
t−1
)
,
(
Kˆ
t
))
secret sharing scheme from [29],
[30]. The resulting shares are denoted by Sjn,T , where n is the file index i.e., n ∈ {1, .., N}, j
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is the index of the encoded symbol, i.e., j = 1, .., h, and T ⊆ [Kˆ], |T | = t. Each share has size
Fs =
F
r
− NF
D(
Kˆ
t
)− (Kˆ−1
t−1
) = t (1− NrD )
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F bits. (36)
The server allocates the shares Sjn,T , ∀n in the cache of user k whenever j ∈ N (Uk) and
Index(j, k) ∈ T . Therefore, at the end of cache placement phase, the contents of the cache
memory at relay j and user k are given by
Vj =
{
f j,1n : ∀n
}
, Zk =
{
Sjn,T : k∈N (Γj), Index(j, k) ∈ T , ∀n
}
. (37)
Remark 7. Each user stores Dr
(
Kˆ−1
t−1
)
shares, thus the accumulated number of bits stored in
each cache memory is
Dr
(
Kˆ − 1
t− 1
)
t
(
1− Nr
D
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F = tD
Kˆ − t
(
1− Nr
D
)
F = MF. (38)
Clearly, the proposed scheme satisfies the cache capacity constraint at both relays and end users.
Furthermore, from (38), we can get t = KˆM
D+M−Nr . 
B. Coded Delivery Phase
At the beginning of the delivery phase, each user requests a file from the server. First, we
focus on the transmissions from the server to Γj . At each transmission instance, we consider
S ⊆ [Kˆ], where |S| = t+ 1. For each S, the server transmits the following signal to Γj
XSj,d =
⊕
{i:i∈N (Γj), Index(j,i)∈S}
Sjdi,S\{Index(j,i)}. (39)
In total, the server transmits to Γj , the signal Xj,d =
⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t+1{XSj,d}. Then, Γj forwards
the signal XSj,d to user i whenever Index(j, i) ∈ S. In addition, Γj sends directly f j,1di to user i.
Therefore, we have
Yj,d,i = {f j,1di }
⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t+1,Index(j,i)∈S
{
XSj,d
}
. (40)
User i can recover {Sjdi,T : T ⊆ [Kˆ] \ {Index(j, i)}, |T | = t} from the signals received from
21
Γj , utilizing its cache’s contents. Adding these shares to the ones in its cache, i.e., S
j
di,T with
Index(j, i) ∈ T , user i can decode the encoded symbol f j,2di from its
(
Kˆ
t
)
shares. Since, user i
receives signals from r different relay nodes, it obtains the encoded symbols f jdi , ∀j ∈ N (Ui),
and can reconstruct Wdi .
C. Secure Caching Rates
Under secure caching requirement, we denote the first and second hop rates as Rc1 and R
c
2,
respectively. Since, each relay node is responsible for
(
Kˆ
t+1
)
transmissions, each of length Fs,
the transmission rate, in bits, from the server to each relay node is
Rc1F =
t
(
Kˆ
t+1
) (
1− Nr
D
)
F
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
) = Kˆ (1− NrD )F
r(t+1)
=
Kˆ(D+M − rN)
r
(
(Kˆ+1)M+D− rN
) (1− Nr
D
)
F. (41)
Then, each relay forwards
(
Kˆ−1
t
)
from these signals to each of its connected end users. In
addition, each relay forwards NF
D
bits from its cache to each of these users, therefore
Rc2F =
(
Kˆ − 1
t
)
t
(
1− Nr
D
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F + NF
D
=
1
r
F. (42)
Consequently, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The normalized rates with secure caching, for 0 ≤ N ≤ D
r
, M= tD
Kˆ−t(1− NrD ), and
t∈{0, 1, .., Kˆ−1}, are upper bounded by
Rc1 ≤
Kˆ(D+M − rN)
r
(
(Kˆ+1)M+D− rN
) (1− Nr
D
)
, Rc2 ≤
1
r
. (43)
The convex envelope of these points is achievable by memory sharing. 
Remark 8. Secret sharing encoding guarantees that no user is able to reconstruct any file from
its cache contents only, as the cached shares are not sufficient to reveal any information about
any file. In addition, the only new information in the received signals by any end user is the
shares related to its requested file. Thus, (33) is satisfied. 
For the special case of no relay caches, we obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 3. The normalized rates with secure caching, for N = 0, M = tD
Kˆ−t , and t ∈
{0, 1, .., Kˆ−1}, are upper bounded by
Rc1 ≤
Kˆ(D+M)
r
(
(Kˆ+1)M+D
) , Rc2 ≤ 1r . (44)
The convex envelope of these points is achievable by memory sharing. 
Remark 9. From the results in [20] and [21], it is known that, under secure caching requirement,
the number bits received by any user is lower bounded by the file size. Thus, Rc2 in (43) is optimal.
In addition, to achieve zero rate over the first hop, we need N ≥ D
r
, where we distribute the
library over the relays caches and we do not need to utilize the caches at the end users due to
the unicast nature of the network links. 
VI. COMBINATION NETWORKS WITH SECURE CACHING AND SECURE DELIVERY
Now, we investigate the network under the requirements studied in Sections IV and V,
simultaneously. The achievability scheme utilizes both one-time pads and secret sharing.
A. Cache Placement Phase
For M= 1 + tD
Kˆ−t(1− rND+Kˆ ), and t ∈ {0, 1, .., Kˆ−1}, after encoding each file using an (h, r)
MDS code, we divide each encoded symbol into two parts, f i,1n with size
NF
D+Kˆ
bits and f i,2n with
size F
r
− NF
D+Kˆ
bits. Only Γi caches the parts {f i,1n : ∀n}.
Each of the symbols f i,2n is encoded using a
((
Kˆ−1
t−1
)
,
(
Kˆ
t
))
secret sharing scheme from [29],
[30]. The resulting shares are denoted by Sjn,T , where n is the file index i.e., n ∈ {1, .., N}, j
is the index of the encoded symbol, i.e., j = 1, .., h, and T ⊆ [Kˆ], |T | = t. Each share has size
Fs =
F
r
− NF
D+Kˆ(
Kˆ
t
)− (Kˆ−1
t−1
) = t
(
1− Nr
D+Kˆ
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F bits. (45)
The server allocates the shares Sjn,T , ∀n in the cache of user k whenever j ∈ N (Uk) and
Index(j, k) ∈ T .
Furthermore, the server generates h
(
Kˆ
t+1
)
independent keys. Each key is uniformly distributed
with length Fs bits. We denote each key by KuTK , where u=1, .., h, and TK ⊆ [Kˆ], |TK | = t+ 1.
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User i stores the keys KuTK , ∀u∈N (Ui), whenever Index(u, i) ∈ TK . Also, the sever generates
the random keys Kij each of length
NF
D+Kˆ
bits, for i = 1, .., h and j = 1, .., Kˆ, which will be
cached by relay i and user k with Index(i, k) = j.
Therefore, at the end of cache placement phase, the contents of the cache memory at relay j
and user k are given by
Vj =
{
f j,1n , K
j
u : ∀n, u
}
, (46)
Zk =
{
Sjn,T , K
j
TK, K
j
l : ∀n,∀j∈N (Uk), Index(j, k)∈T , TK , Index(j, k) = l
}
. (47)
Remark 10. In addition to the keys, each user stores Dr
(
Kˆ−1
t−1
)
shares, thus the accumulated
number of bits stored in each cache memory is
Dr
(
Kˆ − 1
t− 1
) t(1− Nr
D+Kˆ
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F + r(Kˆ − 1
t
) t(1− Nr
D+Kˆ
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F + r NF
D + Kˆ
=
Dt
(
1− Nr
D+Kˆ
)
r(Kˆ − t) F +
(
1− Nr
D + Kˆ
)
F + r
NF
D + Kˆ
= MF. (48)
Thus, the scheme satisfies the memory constraints, and we get t = Kˆ(M−1)(D+Kˆ)
(D+Kˆ)(M+D−1)+rND . 
B. Coded Delivery Phase
The delivery phase begins with announcing the demand vector to all network nodes. For Γj ,
at each transmission instance, we consider a S ⊆ [Kˆ], where |S| = t+ 1. For each S, the server
transmits to Γj , the following signal
XSj,d = K
j
S
⊕
{i:i∈N (Γj), Index(j,i)∈S}
Sjdi,S\{Index(j,i)}, (49)
i.e., the server transmits to Γj , the signal Xj,d =
⋃
S⊆[Kˆ]:|S|=t+1{XSj,d}. Then, Γj forwards the
signal XSj,d to user i whenever Index(j, i) ∈ S. In addition, Γj sends f j,1di encrypted by Kju to
user i such that Index(j, i) = k. After decrypting the received signals, user i get f j,1di and can
extract the set of shares {Sjdi,T : T ⊆ [Kˆ] \ {Index(j, i)}, |T | = t} from the signals received
from Γj . These shares in addition to the ones in its cache, i.e., S
j
di,T with Index(j, i) ∈ T , allow
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user i to decode f j,2di from its
(
Kˆ
t
)
shares. Since, user i receives signals from r different relay
nodes, it obtains {f jdi , ∀j ∈ N (Ui)}, then decodes Wdi .
C. Secure Caching and Secure Delivery Rates
We refer to the first and second hop rates as Rsc1 and R
sc
2 , respectively. Each relay node sends(
Kˆ
t+1
)
signals, each of length Fs, thus we have
Rsc1 F =
(
Kˆ
t+ 1
) t(1− Nr
D+Kˆ
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F = Kˆ
r(t+ 1)
(
1− Nr
D + Kˆ
)
F
=
Kˆ
(
rND + (D + Kˆ)(M +D − 1)
)
r
(
rND + (D + Kˆ)[D + (M − 1)(Kˆ + 1)]
) (1− Nr
D + Kˆ
)
F. (50)
In the second hop, each relay node is responsible for forwarding
(
Kˆ−1
t
)
from its received signals
to each of its connected end users, in addition, it transmits NF
D+Kˆ
bits from its cache, thus
Rsc2 F =
(
Kˆ − 1
t
) t(1− Nr
D+Kˆ
)
r(Kˆ − t)(Kˆ−1
t−1
)F + NF
D + Kˆ
=
1
r
F. (51)
Therefore, we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Under secure delivery and secure caching requirements, for 0 ≤ N ≤ D+Kˆ
r
,
M= 1 + tD
Kˆ−t(1− rND+Kˆ ), and t ∈ {0, 1, .., Kˆ−1}, the transmission rates are upper bounded by
Rsc1 ≤
Kˆ
(
rND + (D + Kˆ)(M +D − 1)
)
r
(
rND + (D + Kˆ)[D + (M − 1)(Kˆ + 1)]
) (1− Nr
D + Kˆ
)
, Rsc2 ≤
1
r
. (52)
In addition, the convex envelope of these points is achievable by memory sharing. 
For the case where there is no caches at the relays, we have
Corollary 4. Under secure delivery and secure caching requirements, for N = 0, M= tD
Kˆ−t+1,
and t ∈ {0, 1, .., Kˆ−1}, the transmission rates are upper bounded by
Rsc1 ≤
Kˆ(D +M − 1)
r
(
(Kˆ + 1)(M − 1) +D
) , Rsc2 ≤ 1r . (53)
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Fig. 2: Lower and upper bounds for K = 35, N = 0, D=50, h=7 and r=3 .
In addition, the convex envelope of these points is achievable by memory sharing. 
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the insights gained from our study and demonstrate the performance
of our proposed techniques. We focus on the achievable rates over the links of each hop of
communication.
A. Achievable Rates over the First Hop
Fig. 2 shows the comparison between the achievable normalized rate of our proposed scheme
in Corollary 1 (the special case with no caching at the relays), lower bound in Theorem 2, lower
bound under uncoded prefetching [11], the coded multicasting and combination network coding
(CM-CNC) scheme [8], and the routing scheme from [8]. We can see that our proposed scheme
outperforms the ones in [8]. We remark that in this special case of no caching relays, the lower
bounds in subsection III-E1 reduce to the ones in [8]. Therefore, the same order optimality as
in [8, Theorem 4] applies.
In Fig. 3, we plot the normalized rate for different relay cache sizes. It can be observed that the
normalized rates are decreasing functions of the memory capacities and whenever M+rN ≥ 60,
R1 = 0, while R2 = 0 if M ≥ 60. This shows how the cache memories at the relay nodes as
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Fig. 3: Lower and upper bounds for K = 35, D=60, h=7 and r=4.
well as the ones at the end users can completely replace the main server during the delivery
phase. We note that the gap between lower and upper bound decreases as M increases.
B. Optimality over the Second Hop
From the cut set bound in Theorem 2, we see that our achievable rate over the second hop is
optimal. Thus, the total delivery load per relay is minimized.
For the network with no caches at the relays, it has been shown in [11] that the proposed
schemes achieve lower rates over the first hop compared with the scheme in [10], i.e., achieves
lower R1 than our scheme in Section III, for the case where M = N/K. Additionally, it has
been shown that the schemes in [11] achieve the optimal rate under uncoded prefetching for
r = h − 1. Note that the scheme based on interference alignment in [11] for the case where
M = D/K achieves lower rates over the first hop, however the achievable rate during the second
hop is not optimal. As an example consider the network with D = K = 6, h = 4, r = 2 and
M = 1, the normalized optimal delivery load during the second hop is 5
12
and it is achievable
by our scheme. The scheme in [11, Section IV-B] achieves normalized delivery load of 7
12
. On
the other hand, in this example, the scheme in [11, Section IV-B] achieves R1 = 23 , while our
scheme achieves 1. Therefore, the total normalized network load, i.e., hR1 +rKR2, under the
scheme in [11, Section IV-B] is 29
3
, while our scheme achieves 9. This example demonstrates
27
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
M
1
2
3
4
5
6
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
tr
an
sm
is
si
on
ra
te
R
1
No secrecy
Secure delivery
Secure caching
Secure caching and secure delivery
Fig. 4: Rates over the first hop under different system requirements for N = 0, D=50, K=15, h=5 and r=3.
to the importance of ensuring the optimality over the second hop in order to reduce the overall
network load.
C. Performance with Secrecy Requirements
In Figs. 4 and 5, we compare the achievable rates under different secrecy scenarios. From
these figures, we observe that the cost of imposing secure delivery is negligible for realistic
system parameters. The gap between the achievable rates of the system without secrecy and
the system with secure delivery vanishes as M increases. Same observation holds for the gap
between the rates with secure caching and those with secure caching and secure delivery.
In addition, achievable rates over the second hop is optimal, i.e., achieves the cut set bound. In
particular, under secure delivery, each user caches a fraction M−1
N−1 of each file, and the total data
received by any end user under secure delivery equals (1−M−1
N−1 )F , which is the minimum number
of bits required to reconstruct the requested file. Similarly, in the two remaining scenarios, we
know from the result in reference [20] that the minimum number of bits required by each user
to be able to recover its requested file is F , and our achievable schemes achieve this lower
bound. Another observation is that under secure caching requirement only (Section V), we do
not need to use keys in order to ensure the secure caching requirement, in contrast with the
general schemes in references [20] and [21]. This follows from the network structure, as the
relay nodes unicast the signals to each of the end users. In particular, the received signals by user
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k are formed by combinations of the shares in its memory and ”fresh” shares of the requested
file. Thus, at the end of communications, it has r
(
Kˆ
t
)
shares of the file Wdk , and only r
(
Kˆ−1
t−1
)
shares of the remaining files, i.e., the secure caching requirement is satisfied, without the need to
encrypt. In addition, for the case where M = 0, i.e., no cache memory at the end users, secure
caching is possible via routing, unlike the case in [20], where M must be at least 1.
Remark 11. Corollaries 2-4 generalize our previous results that were limited to resolvable
networks [22], i.e., we show the achievability of the rates in [22] for any combination network.

VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the fundamental limits two-hop cache-aided combination
networks with caches at the relays and the end users, with and without security requirements.
We have proposed a new coded caching scheme, by utilizing MDS coding and jointly optimizing
the cache placement and delivery phases. We have shown that whenever the sum of the end user
cache and the ones of its connected relays is sufficient to store the database, then there is no
need for the server transmission over the first hop. We have developed genie-aided cut-set lower
bounds on the rates and shown order optimality for the first hop and optimality for the second.
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We have next investigated combination networks with caching relays under secure delivery
constraints, secure caching constraints, as well as both secure delivery and secure caching
constraints. The achievability schemes, for each of these requirements, jointly optimize the
cache placement and delivery phases, and utilize one-time padding and secret sharing. We have
illustrated the impact of the network structure and relaying on the system performance after
imposing different secrecy constraints.
The decomposition philosophy using MDS codes we have utilized in this work allows adopting
the ideas developed for the classical coded caching setup to cache-aided combination networks.
Future directions in combination networks include caching with untrusted relays and considering
the physical layer impairments in the delivery phase.
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